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THE DILEMMA OF
THE NATURAL LAW*
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KENEALY,

GOBLE

in his excellent article, "Whose

Natural Law?"' asks, "whose natural law" I was criticising in my
article "Nature, Man and Law.' '2 The answer is that the primary target
of my criticism was the natural law which developed in Europe in the
17th and 18th centuries and was transported to the United States in the
18th and 19th centuries. Dean Pound called this the "classical natural
law," and as quoted in my previous article he defined it as follows:
According to the classical natural-law theory, all positive law, i.e.,
the whole body of legal precepts that furnish the grounds of actual decision in the courts, [is] but a more or less feeble reflection of an ideal
body of perfect rules, demonstrable by reason, and valid for all times,
all places and all men. 3
In the same article Dean Pound also said:
Positive legal precepts got their whole validity from their conformity to these ideal rules [of natural law]. In other words, jurists and
judges were striving to make the grounds of decision conform to an
ideal philosophical pattern resting on reason and identical with an
ideal moral pattern. .

.

. It was less important to decide particular

causes justly than to work out sound, logically consistent and abstractly
4
just rules for the future.
"Thus the natural-law theory," he said, "was kept alive in America
long after it had ceased to be a living theory in the Old World ..

*Reprinted

from 2 CATHOLic LAWYER 226 (July, 1956).

1 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 259 (Oct. 1955).
2 GOBLE, Nature, Man and Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955).
3 POUND, The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1923).
4 Id. at 802-03.

5 Id. at 804.
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These natural-law ideas were carried forward in America by what Dean Pound
called the "historico-analytical" theory
which after performing a certain usefulness
in giving our law stability, finally became
"an obstacle to growth, a check on all conscious improvement of law, at the end of
the century." Of the lawyer of this period
Pound said:
It was the confident belief of the historico-analytical common-law lawyer that
he could solve any problem whatsoever
on the basis of the seventeenth-century...
Year Books. New forms of doing business,
new agencies of menace to the general security, new forms and purposes of association, new conceptions of human relations and new social habits were quite
immaterial. Here were the absolute universal . . . conceptions. . . . It was the
office of the judge to fit the case to the
7
conception after the manner of Procrustes.
This view explains why, says Pound,
.. American state courts from 1890 to
1910 were so confidently dogmatic in holding modern social legislation to be unconstitutional."'8 This theory of law and attitude of the courts is attributable to the
natural law by Pound in the opening sentence of his article: "All nineteenth-century
theories of judicial decision in one way or
another grow out of the natural-law thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries." 9

6 Id. at 807.
7 Id. at 817.
8 Id. at 822. On natural law theories that influenced early American thinking, see LE BOUTIL-
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It was this conception of natural law to
which I took exception, and I am glad that
Father Kenealy seems to be in accord with
my objections, or at least concedes that my
arguments have "considerable relevance to
the 'natural law' theories of Pufendorf,
Thomasius, Hobbes, Spinoza and their followers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries."10
II
But, says Father Kenealy, the natural
law described by Dean Pound is not the
natural law. It is spurious. Father Kenealy
then sets forth a conception of natural law
which differs in important respects from
that described by Dean Pound. The seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers
named above are the "express adversaries"
of the classical natural law, says Father
Kenealy. He criticises them for extending
the immutability idea to so large an area
of the law. Their system purported "to
regulate and to crystallize all legal institutions down to incredible details." In contrast, Father Kenealy's natural law envisages many "derivative principles" which
do not have this attribute, but which are
only probably or possibly true, and in these
derivatives are found the elements of
"growth, change and improvement"" in
the law.
This divergence of opinion raises the
question as to who is to say what is the
natural law. Who is to say what is the
classicalnatural law? The people who write

LIER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND NATURAL LAW

(1950).
The Theory of Judicial Decisions, 36
HARv.L. REv. 802 (1923).
9 POUND,

Whose Natural Law?, 1
LAWYER 259, 261 (Oct. 1955).
11 Id. at 262.
10 KENEALY,

CATHOLIC

THE DILEMMA OF THE NATURAL LAW

classics don't call them classics. Things
come to be what people call them, and
sometimes the same name is applied to
two or more things. In England "wheat"
is called "corn." In America "maize" is
called "corn." I see no point in trying to
show that "corn" is really "wheat" and
not "maize." A number of different systems
2
of law have been called "natural law."'
I don't know upon what basis it can be
claimed that one system is more entitled
to that designation than another. Anyway,
the matter of labeling seems relatively unimportant. And in any event, if naturallaw-type-A is criticised, it can hardly be
contended that the criticism is unsound
because it does not apply to natural-lawtype-B. That, however, seems to be the
main theme of Father Kenealy's objections
to my article. I criticised the natural law
described by Dean Pound. Father Kenealy
described another system called natural
law, and then took great pains to show
that my criticism had no application to it,
and further that since it did not, it is obvious that I do not understand his system.
But now that Father Kenealy has put his
system of natural law in issue, I hope it will
not be inappropriate, in this article, to devote some attention to it. Father Kenealy's
system as well as the system described by
Pound, encompasses what are called "fundamental principles" which are said to be
"certain, immutable and universal," and
which are "antecedent, both in logic and
in nature, to the formation of civil soci-

eties.' 13 To the extent that Father Kenealy's
system incorporates this view it seems to
me to be vulnerable to at least some of the
criticisms set forth in my article. I shall
attempt to show the bases for this opinion.
The title to Father Kenealy's article,
"Whose Natural Law?" points up the problem: when two or more groups of men of
equal sincerity and reasonableness claim
universality and immutability for certain
principles of law, and they are in disagreement as to what those principles are, by
what criterion is the choice to be made between them? Whose natural law is the natural law? Father Kenealy's answer to this
question is that the true natural law is that
which can be shown to be valid by "objective evidence." My critic says:
I infer that Professor Goble believes
that the epistemological basis of natural law
philosophy is: the criterion of truth is subjective certitude or sincerity of subjective

conviction. This is simply not true ...
[N]atural law philosophers unanimously set
up objective evidence as the criterion of

truth. 14

These positive assertions by Father
Kenealy that immutable and universal principles of natural law are established by
"objective evidence" are mystifying. I know
of no scientific means, or trial and error
procedures by which principles of law can
be determined to be immutable and universal. How can it be established by objective evidence that principles are good or
bad for society if we must accept them as

12 See WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF

NATURAL LAW 327-47 (1931), where eight different interpretations of the word "natural" are
listed.

13 KENEALY,

Whose Natural Law?, 1

LAWYER 259, 260 (Oct. 1955).
14 Id. at 264.
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immutably created before there was any
society? Before society was formed there
could have been no objective evidence as
to the principles by which members of
society were or should be controlled; nor
could the mind have discovered, by logic
or otherwise, principles which should be
applied to facts then unknown. And after
society was formed how could it then be
determined that these principles were valid
before society was formed? Furthermore,
what would be the purpose in testing by
objective evidence principles which are assumed to be universal and immutable before they are tested? By hypothesis, such
principles are not subject to limitation or
change even if experience showed that they
should be limited or changed.
We can test a legal principle to determine whether it is presently good or bad.
But there is no way of testing it to determine whether it was good or bad in the
remote past before there was any society.
Assuming that a principle has always been
good and always will be good, how can
that fact be proved presently by "objective
evidence"? The only basis for a belief in
the validity of a principle before or after
the date of its verification by evidence is
probability. If the principle is valid today it
was probably valid yesterday, and will
probably be valid tomorrow. However, as
the period of time before or after the date
of verification is lengthened, the probability
of the validity of the rule gradually decreases to a point where it vanishes. To
the extent that we project a principle forward or backward beyond this point of
time, we rely solely on faith, and not on
objective evidence. If it be objected that
even science has no better method for de-
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termining principles than by use of objective evidence, the answer is, of course not,
but science limits itself to stating its laws
as probabilities or plausibilities, and not as
absolutes, universals or immutables. If it
be objected that legal empiricists have no
better basis for their conclusions, the answer again is, of course not, but they do
not claim that their generalizations are universal or immutable. Formerly science
stated its conclusions, or at least some of
them, in the form of absolutes. But so
many of these have been proved fallacious
that now sciences satisfies itself with more
cautious statements. 5
III
The proposition that certain legal principles are "antecedent, both in logic and in
nature, to the formation of civil societies"
seems to assume that the mind can reason
without experience-that it can by deductive logic reach conclusions about how
men ought to conduct themselves in society,
before society exists, and therefore before
there are facts upon which reasoning can
be based. Psychologists, I believe, would
deny this. The mind cannot create knowledge. It cannot think in a vacuum. It can
no more reason without facts than a mill
can grind without grist.
Father Kenealy's primary principle is,
"What is good, is to be done and what is

15 See REICHENBACH,

THE

RISE OF

SCIENTIFIC

PHILOSOPHY ( 1951 ), especially Chapter l0 on the
relativity of scientific knowledge and the theory
of probabilities. This book shows the impact of
modern science upon philosophy, a fact which it,
seems to me, is largely ignored by advocates of
natural law.
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evil is to be avoided ..

NATURAL

LAW

."16 But this state-

ment could have no meaning to the mind
of a person who had had no social experience. A blank mind could not visualize
a situation to which the principle applied.
The principle could not be established by
logic or by nature until experience gave
the mind the stuff by which it could be
determined what sort of acts were good
acts and what sort were bad. If we define
"good" in general terms, that is, without
reference to particular acts, we would have
to say something like this, "good is what
one ought to do." But if we do that, the
principle becomes tautological, i.e., "one
ought to do what one ought to do." This
can hardly be said to be a principle at all.
Our knowledge of primitive languages
indicates that man first thought in terms of
specific things, and not in abstract or general terms. He had a word for a particular
tree or spear before he had a word for trees
or spears in general. 7 Likewise he thought
in terms of specific acts before he began to
put acts into classes or groups. It seems
probable that primitive man very early
learned by trial and error what specific acts
promoted his well being, and what acts injured it. After he acquired the power of
abstraction and generalization he put into
one category the acts that promoted his
well being and called them "good," and
into another category, the acts that harmed
him and called them "evil." Not until then

16 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955). As to the tautology or "emptiness" of such statements, see REICHENBACH, supra note 15.
17 FULLER, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 877,

889-90 (1931).

was it meaningful to say "do what is good;
avoid what is evil."
IV
According to Father Kenealy, the principles expressed in the Decalogue have the
qualities of "certainty, universality and immutability." Suppose we consider the Commandment "Thou shalt not kill." Notwithstanding the literally clear, unqualified and
unconditional statement of this injunction,
one may justifiably kill another in self defense, in defense of his family, or even in
defense of a stranger. A sheriff may legally
execute one sentenced to death for the commission of a crime, and a policeman may
kill an escaping felon. A soldier in the
armed forces of his country may kill as
many of the enemy as he can. The larger
the number he kills the greater hero he is.
These are generally recognized exceptions
to the mandate "Thou shalt not kill." But
these exceptions are in no sense "derived"
from the rule, as Father Kenealy seems to
suggest. An exception which permits killing
cannot be "derived" from a rule which says
the exact opposite. Rather these exceptions
come from something outside the rule. They
come from other rules of policy, justice or
expediency. If that is true then the question
immediately arises, if these exceptions are
permissible, may not other exceptions also
be permissible. The principle itself is completely silent on how exceptions shall be
determined. Must not other exceptions depend upon experience and new ideas as to
policy, justice or expediency?
Suppose our country declares an unjust
war (as many thought the Mexican war to
be ) and a volunteer in the army kills as
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many of the enemy as he can, has he
violated the mandate against killing? What
about a soldier on the other side killing as
many of our men as he can? Has he violated
the injunction? Then there is the question
as to whether there was a war at all. Our
pioneers fought the Indians in many undeclared wars. We were frequently the aggressors, the Indians the defenders. At any
rate we now have the territory the Indians
had, and they have little or nothing in its
place. Were the pioneers justified under the
biblical injunction in killing Indians? When
the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, war
had not been officially declared. Were our
men justified in shooting down the attackers? They could have deserted their
posts and saved themselves. Were we justified in dropping the A-bomb on Hiroshima,
killing and maiming thousands of nonfighting men, women and children?
We start with the mandate "Thou shalt
not kill," and we wind up killing men,
women and children right and left by the
tens of thousands. If we justify all these
killings, we have made exception after exception to the principle. How do we know
that we have not made too many exceptions
or that we have not made enough? The rule
itself does not help us. Only experience,
and considerations outside the rule can furnish the answer to these questions. If we
are justified in killing a Russian spy for
performing what he conceives to be his
patriotic duty, why are we not justified in
taking the life of a person who wants to
die because of an incurable illness or of
taking the life of an unborn infant to save
the life of its mother? 18
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Primitive man had no compunction
about taking human life. He killed those he
loved-his wife, children or slaves-as
sacrifices at seedtime or on festive occasions.19 It was not self-evident to him that
he should not kill. In the seventeenth century hanging was the penalty for robbery.
Such a severe penalty is not now permissible. The hangman in the seventeenth
century was not guilty of a crime for hanging a convicted robber. The hanging was
an exception to the rule against killing.
At the present time he would be guilty of
a crime. The rule to not kill has been expanded to cover a situation not covered
before. Then is the rule against killing universal as to time, as to place or as to
situation? Is it immutable or does it
change? If it changes, then are not the
boundaries of the rule itself shifted by
these variations in time, place or situation?
If it be said that the principle "Thou shalt
not kill" simply prohibits killing under
ordinary circumstances, the question still
remains by what standard is it to be determined that the circumstances are ordinary. The question is always present,
does the particular case come under the
general rule or should it be made an exception. The rule furnishes no standard for
answering this question.
This is not to say that "Thou shalt not
kill" is not a good general rule, or that it
is not invaluable as a starting point in solving a problem involving a killing, or that
it does not establish a probability. It is to
say, that the statement is like any other

cussion of this and other cases in CAHN, THE

18 See, on this problem, REPOUILLE V. UNITED
STATES, 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947) and the dis-

MORAL DECISION 300 (1955).
19 WELLS, THE OUTLINE OF

(1921).

HISTORY

104-05
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general rule, in that the type and number of
exceptions to it must be worked out by
considerations outside the rule and that
when they are worked out the rule itself is
changed. It is a general rule that a promise
to be binding must have consideration. But
experience has shown the desirability of a
number of exceptions. These exceptions are
not derived from the rule but from other
factors. As a result of the exceptions the
rule is modified.
So while the desirability of general rules
is not here controverted, it is asserted that
the framing of general rules that are universal and immutable and to which no exceptions are to be made is impossible. Certainly as a matter of semantics it cannot be
contended that a rule to which an exception
is made is not changed. Make enough exceptions to a rule and the rule disappears.
This has frequently happened in the history
of our law, e.g., the rule that a person who
is not a party to a contract cannot sue upon
it, and the rule that impossibility is no
excuse for the non-performance of a contractual promise.
V
Father Kenealy's anticipatory answer to
this argument is that:
It is a commonplace in classical natural
law philosophy that human rights, even the
most fundamental . . . are limited. They
are limited in the sense that they are subject to specification, qualification, expansion and contraction, and even forfeiture
of exercise .... 20

20 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, 1 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 259, 263-64

(Oct.

1955).

But this argument is completely unsatisfactory. It is simply linguistic gymnastics
to say in one breath that a principle is "certain, universal and immutable" or that a
right is "absolute," and in the next that it
is, nevertheless, subject to "qualification,"
"expansion," "contraction" or "forfeiture."
"Qualification" and "contraction" include
"exception," and an "exception" is an actual subtraction from the rule. Each exception reduces the scope of the rule by the
amount of the exception, and therefore
makes it apply to fewer situations. By any
reasonable definition this is a change in
the rule itself. As I have tried to show, it
is the qualifications, contractions, expansions and exceptions that determine the
boundary lines of a rule and therefore
determine the full scope and meaning of the
rule itself. It seems to me that Father
Kenealy has paid a terrific price in semantics to make it possible to say that his
fundamental principles are "certain, universal and immutable."
VI
Father Kenealy objects to my argument
that the inconsistencies between natural
law systems make it impossible to make
a reasonable choice between them. He
states that my argument proves too much,
that "its probative value, if any, militates
against any and all philosophies." This
point however is not well taken. My argument is based on the premise that the
qualities of "universality" and "immutability" of rules cannot be proved by objective
evidence. The existence of these properties
can be based only upon faith. This is not
the situation with respect to philosophies
not claiming these infallible attributes. This
issue is pointed up by Father Kenealy's as-
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sertion that all true "natural law philosophers agree on the fundamental principles
of the natural law ....
"21 What this means
is that only those philosophers who agree
with Father Kenealy are true natural-law
lawyers. The philosophies of all others are
spurious. Advocates of the seventeenthcentury natural law made the same claim to
authenticity. So we have two claimants to
a universal and immutable set of principles. Which is true? Neither can be
proved by objective evidence, and their inconsistencies militate against either of them
being accepted on faith. To an objective
observer there would be no more reason for
accepting one system than the other. The
universality and immutability of principles
of law can either be determined by objective evidence or they cannot. If they can
be so determined, the whole body of natural law becomes a system of empirical
law. If they cannot be so determined, then
objective evidence cannot be used to show
the validity of one system over another
claiming the same attributes. This is the
dilemma of the natural law.
VII
Father Kenealy also takes exception to
my statement that the natural law is assumed to have "attained perfection. '22 But
to say that certain principles are "universal
and immutable," as Father Kenealy does,
with his fundamentals, is to say, it seems
to me, that those principles do not need
changing and that they are therefore perfect.
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I am asked by Father Kenealy to name
a "representative natural law philosopher
• . . [who] held to the principle that 'by
natural law, freedom of contract could not
be interfered with by legislation'?"23 This
is a loaded question, because if I name such
a person, all Father Kenealy need do is to
say that my selection is not a "representative natural-law philosopher" and he will
not be representative because he takes that
view. There were certainly a number of
judges who claimed to be natural-law
lawyers who held to the theory of the inviolability of freedom of contract. Justices
Chase, Field, Miller, and Brewer may be
mentioned as among those who at various
times took this view. 24 These judges were
representatives of the natural law of the
nineteenth century, if not of the natural
law of Father Kenealy.
Father Kenealy further questions, "what
principle held to be certain, universal and
immutable has been relinquished at any
time by devotees of the classical natural
law?" 25 This question is also impossible to

23 Id. at 263.

24 See e.g., Chase, J., in CALDER v. BULL, 3 Dali.
386, 388 (U.S. 1798); Field, J., in BUTCHERS'
UNION V. CRESCENT, 111 U.S. 746, 756 (1884).
Other cases such as ADAIR V. UNITED STATES, 208

U.S. 161 (1908); COPPAGE v. KANSAS, 236 U.S.
1 (1914),

are illustrative of the type of argument

used by the courts in reading into the Constitution
the "freedom of contract" idea, which it would
seem is based on the theory that the Constitution
incorporated by implication the natural law concepts of the eighteenth century. In support of
this interpretation of the cases, see HAINES, THE
REVIVAL

(1930),

OF NATURAL

and also

LAW CONCEPTS 210-32
JURISPRUDENCE

REUSCHLEIN,

23-28 (1951).
Id. at 265.
22 Ibid.
21

25 KENEALY, Whose Natural Law?, I CATHOLIC

LAWYER 259, 262 (Oct. 1955).
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answer to Father Kenealy's satisfaction, because any person I might name as having
relinquished a fundamental principle of
natural law would by such relinquishment
disqualify himself as a "devotee" of Father
Kenealy's classical natural law. If my answer to the first question is accepted, then
my answer to this inquiry would be that
there has been a recession from the principle of the inviolability of the freedom of
contract.
In relation to this question I would like
to propose the name of Judge Robert N.
Wilkin as one who meets all of Father
Kenealy's requirements for a classical
natural-law lawyer. He has been classified
as a neo-scholastic and has written extensively upon the subject. 26 In 1952, Judge
Wilkin wrote a judicial opinion in which
he stated that since it is contrary to nature
for black birds, white birds, red birds and
blue birds to roost on the same limb of a
tree, it is contrary to natural law for colored persons to have a right to the use
of a public golf course which by city
ordinance was limited to white persons. "It
seems" said the judge, "that segregation is
not only recognized in constitutional law
and judicial decision, but that it is also
supported by general principles of natural
law."' 27 Now, according to Father Kenealy,
"natural law philosophers agree on the
fundamental principles of natural law."
Since, then, it may be assumed that Judge
Wilkin and Father Kenealy are in accord
on those principles, it is pertinent to ask

I did list Judge Wilkin under the neoscholastics in my book. I did this before
Hayes v. Crutcher came down. I see inconsistencies in Judge Wilkin's opinion
in the Hayes case. For example, at one
point he says, "It seems that segregation
is not only recognized in constitutional
law and judicial decision, but that it is
also supported by general principles of
natural law." Later in the same opinion,
he says, "This Court therefore concludes
that segregation itself (where legal rights
are unaffected) is not unconstitutional or
unlawful; that it is a natural tendency
which in the progress of man's political,
social and spiritual evolution may change
or disappear." Well, what does he really
mean? Does he mean that segregation
is-something "supported by general
principles of natural law" or merely that
segregation is "a natural tendencywhich-may change or disappear"?
It may be that even a neo-scholastic
may err and fall from grace. Or maybe, I
was wrong. Maybe Judge Wilkin was
and is not a neo-scholastic-but something more akin to the "state of Nature"
kind of natural law man.
Even I am capable of making a mistake but I do not think I did when I
wrote in 1951-and that is when I
wrote. I do not, however, believe that
Judge Wilkin can qualify as a neoscholastic if he really means everything
he wrote in Hayes v. Crutcher.

26 See REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE 391 (1951),

where Judge Wilkin is listed as a neo-scholastic.
27 HAYES V. CRUTCHER, 108 F. Supp. 582, 585
(M. D. Tenn. 1952).

Harold G. Reuschlein
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(1) What fundamental principle of natural
law supports segregation and (2) what is
the "objective evidence" that proves this
principle. The United States Supreme Court,
unhampered by the natural law concepts of
Judge Wilkin, has now unanimously held
an ordinance invalid, which denied colored
28
persons the use of a public golf course.
If a segregation case now comes before
Judge Wilkin, will he hold the Supreme
Court's decision a nullity, because it violates the immutable natural law which is
paramount to the Constitution, or will he
wave a magical wand and hold that the
changeless law has changed?
VIII
Basic to much that has been advanced
in this discussion is the view that a rule
has no objective existence in any other
form than as a group of spoken or written
words, that is, as a symbol. The idea or
judgment which the words symbolize is the
important thing, and it has no existence except in the mind. The rule is therefore
subjective and not objective. 29 The idea

v. ATLANTA, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(per curiam).
29 One cannot be certain that even as to physical
laws, one's mental image corresponds to reality.
"Our scientific laws are always a posteriori, and
governed by the facts to which they must submit. . . . They are therefore essentially relative
and subjective, and their validity is strictly limited
to man and depends on the identity of the other
individuals to the same external stimuli .... It is
clear therefore that expressions such as 'scientific
truth' only should be taken in a very limited sense
and not literally .... There is no scientific truth
in the absolute sense .... We know less about our
material world than is generally believed, and that
our knowledge is subjective, and conditioned by
the structure of our brain." LECOMTE DU NouY,
28 HOLMES

HUMAN DESTINY 15,

38 (New York 1947).
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forming the rule may be conceived as the
result of one's actual observation of facts or
of hearing the facts related by others, or
it may be conceived by one's hearing or
reading it after it has been arranged into
the form of words by someone else. In the
former case the stimulus for the idea has
been the facts concerning which the rule
is made. In the latter the stimulus has been
the spoken or written group of words, which
symbolize the rule. In either case the rule
is subjective. Of course, conduct which results from knowledge of the rule is objective, but conduct in compliance with a rule,
can hardly be said to be the rule itself.
It seems probable that the mind would
not have the power to make a perfect
formulation of a rule upon the basis of a
first experience with a particular group of
facts. The first attempt would be more like
a trial run. The rule may turn out to be
good or bad. However, even if the rule
turned out to be good, it is likely that it
would need modification, revision or restatement as the result of the impact upon
the mind of new situations, or as the result
of new knowledge or insights. In the course
of hundreds of years it seems probable that
a rule would be changed, modified or
restated many times, or even completely
abandoned. This is the method of growth
process of evolution. In the early
-the
history of man, rules no doubt were arbitrary, unreasonable, and even immoral, at
least according to modern standards. With
the development of memory, knowledge
increased and experience in applying rules
gradually stimulated the development of
ideas of policy, justice and morality. Conscience was born, and the element of
"ought" was introduced into rule making.
But the "ought" would have no meaning

THE DILEMMA OF THE NATURAL LAW

unassociated with acts, to which it could
be made to apply. However, as man
acquired wisdom he became able to integrate the acts and the "ought" into the
form of a rule. As he continued to mature
and to acquire greater stature through increased knowledge, the more able he became to make long range plans, to select
more distant goals and to devise more
adequate rules for attaining them. 0 It
appears that Father Kenealy believes that
fundamental principles should not yield to
man's broader knowledge or deeper insights, because he is sure that the funda-

mental principles man now has are "certain,
universal and immutable" and therefore

31
perfect, and incapable of improvement.
This proposition I find myself unable to
accept.

30 See CAHN,

THE MORAL

DECISION,

312-15

(1955).
31 DEAN MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY in an infor-

mative and scholarly article, Natural Law and
Legal Justice, 2 CATHOLIC LAWYER 22 (Jan. 1956)
states that in my article, Nature, Man and Law,
41 A.B.A.J. 403 (1955), I was beating a "straw
man" of my own creation. But Miss Rooney can
hardly be unaware of the tremendous movement
in our law described by Dean Pound and quoted
near the beginning of this article. The impact of
this natural law philosophy, continued for three
centuries, was still very much a vogue in 1930
and even as late as 1952. William Gilligan in his
letter [41 A.B.A.J. 680 (1955)] seems to bring
the theory down to 1955. Note in his comment
the use of "certain absolutes" and the suggestion
that the best way to maintain the natural law doctrine in all its pristine glory is to close the columns of the press to those who criticize it. The
phenomenon was and still is a very vigorous
"straw man," and was of course quite beyond my
power to create. The fact that this is not the
natural law of Thomas Aquinas does not disprove
the movement.
Miss Rooney further says that after pointing
out "the limits of human reason" I lapsed into
a non sequitur by attributing absolutism to ad-

Father Kenealy asserts that "subjectivism
is sheer intellectual defeatism" and that no
philosophy based upon ideological "subjectivism" offers an "intellectually adequate
reply to the destructive philosophy of totalitarianism." The implication of this assertion
is that only natural law, i.e., only a philosophy that accepts the attributes of certainty,
universality and immutability of its fundamental principles can provide an effective
rebuttal to totalitarianism. This position in
my judgment is indefensible. It ignores the
fact that men can believe and vigorously
uphold principles based upon the accumulated wisdom of the ages, and that they can
learn from experience what kind of a government is good and what kind is bad. It
ignores the fact that standards of reference
need not be eternally fixed. One of the most
important procedures in science is to conduct experiments upon the basis of unproved postulates and to judge its results
with reference to unproved values. Though
the pole star moves, it is a reliable guide to
the mariner. Though a raft is drifting it can
be the means of saving the life of a drowning man. The strongest opposition to totalitarianism is found not in natural law, but
in the accumulated wisdom of mankind.

herents of the natural law school." But Miss
Rooney has misunderstood my article. What I
said was (1) that experience shows that the mind
of man is limited in its ability to understand nature; (2) that because of this, in both the physical
and social sciences, we have frequently over-generalized and stated propositions to be absolute
and universal which were later found to be limited or relative; (3) that the particular school of
natural law which I described in the article had
stated its principles in absolute and universal
form, and (4) that this experience indicates that,
in the law as in the sciences, we should be more
cautious in our generalizations and avoid stating
propositions as absolutes or universals simply because we believe them to be true.
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At this juncture I would like to point out
with emphasis, that because I reject the natural law theory of Father Kenealy, I am not
asserting that there are no basic principles
of enduring quality in our law. On the contrary, it is my belief that our composite
wisdom has created a strong probability in
favor of the great worth of many principles,
and these we should uphold and defend,
and should use as criteria for the determination of good and bad, until experience
convinces us of the desirability of change.
Differing from Father Kenealy, I recognize
that new experience, new insights or new
knowledge may show the need for modification, of these fundamental principles

and when they do, the indicated modifications should be made. It is my belief that
in the search for truth the mind should not
be shackled by unverifiable rules.
In closing I wish to say that I appreciate
the fine spirit in which Father Kenealy has
set forth his criticisms of my article. The
whole tenor of his argument is such as to
indicate that he is a man of great sincerity
and goodwill, and that he is a seeker after
truth. Moreover, he is a master dialectician.
It is a pleasure to discuss these issues with
one so dispassionate, so reasonable and so
fair. In this article I have tried, I hope with
success, to maintain the high level of disputation that he has set.

